Fourth Amendment text:

Just imagine a country where you can have your car, your jewelry, your cash, your house and your bank accounts seized by the government without ever having been convicted of a crime. No, not Russia, I'm talking about the United States of America. As the current laws stand, it is entirely possible for the average law abiding citizen to loose all of their property without ever having a chance to say one word in a court of law. In fact, 80% of the people who have their property seized by government officials are never even charged with a crime [1]. Most people in this country think they are protected from such abuses by the Bill of Rights. Well, think again. Today, law enforcement agencies are focusing more on generating income than they are on getting criminals off the streets and protecting the community. Why? Because they get a cut of everything they seize. [2]. The federal and state forfeiture laws in this country are in desparate need of reform. It is clear from the horror stories told by citizens across the country that we need to restore due process and the fundamental rights of "we the people" to have and hold onto our property.

 On May 4th a new bill was introduced in the House, by Judiciary Committee Chair Henry Hyde (R-IL); the "Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1999" otherwise known as HR 1658 [3]. On June 24th the reform bill passed in the U. S. House of Representatives by a vote of 375 to 48, but it still has to pass through the Senate before it becomes law. HR 1658 is not a complete reversal of the current laws but it is the first step to restoring our right to a fair hearing when our property has been accused of a crime. The Bill also provides for a court appointed attorney in cases where a person is rendered indigent by the government seizure. One of the proposed amendments to HR 1658 would require a criminal conviction of the property owner before the property could be seized by the government. This amendment is the ultimate goal of its supporters but the bill has no hope of passing this year if it is added. Supporters are willing to forego this addition in order to get the small amount of protection offered by the bill as it is currently written. Opponents of the Bill fear that it will limit the ability of law enforcement to separate criminals and drug traffickers from their proceeds. This is not true. It will however, limit the ability of law enforcement to seize property from innocent citizens. Legislatures respond to media pressure. Now is the time to get the word out to the public about the abuses of the current laws so we can move forward with this Bill and put the burden of proof back where it belongs--on the government.

 Some Background

 Since the 1970's many statutes have been created that have enabled federal and local law enforcement agencies to search and seize property believed to be involved in, or obtained as a result of, criminal activity. The "Comprehensive Forfeiture Act" of 1984[4] and the 1986 "Anti-drug Abuse Act" [5] prompted even broader applications to the statutes which define current search, seizure, and forfeiture laws. The Supreme Court continues its assertion that the Fourth Amendment has its limitations. One limitation which deserves more attention but for the sake of space I will only touch on, is the interpretation that "property" is not afforded the same protection under the Bill of Rights as "people" and can therefore be confiscated without "due process." (For a more in-depth article on this aspect read Leon Felkins' latest essay: "Property and Liberty: You can't give up one without losing the other" (c) Jan. 2, 1999) What this means is that property can be seized by a government agency without that agency ever having to prove that the property's owner was guilty of a crime because according to the courts, it is the property that is being accused of a crime [6]. This has prompted a wave of new court cases with names like "U. S. vs 676 Bottles of Wine" or "U. S. vs Lear Jet". Up to 85 percent of the property then becomes the asset of the agency which seized it, depending on the agency and the state in which it was seized. The application of these statutes create a conflict of interest which threatens to nullify the very rights that the Fourth Amendment was intended to preserve.

 The newly discovered rough draft of the Declaration of Independence [7] contained, in its list of the King's abuses for which the Colonists declared their independence -- "he has incited treasonable insurrections of our fellow citizens with the allurements of forfeiture and confiscation of our property." From the beginning, our founding fathers sought to protect the rights of individuals from the intrusions and abuses of a government entity. It is clear from Thomas Jefferson's language that government sponsored "confiscation of our property" was a major concern of the people who set out to found a nation. Although the applications of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to specific cases of law have been debated since its inception, the intention seems to be quite clear; the government cannot search or seize an individual's property without a good reason to do so. "Good reason" is more commonly referred to in the legal context as "probable cause." Hence, the debate about what constitutes a "good reason" begins.

 The Reason Behind Forfeiture Laws

 During the 1960's it became clear that imposing jail sentences and fines was having almost no affect on organized crime. If a major player was taken out of the organization by incarceration (or worse) another soldier would just take his place and the business would continue to profit. The Mafia and other such criminal organizations considered it an overhead--the cost of doing business. Clearly, law enforcement has a "good reason" for confiscating any profits made from criminal activity. After all, crime isn't supposed to pay so forfeiture of such profits seems a perfectly acceptable method of combating the problem. The Fourth Amendment has never been an issue where criminal activity is concerned but law enforcement still had to find loop holes through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to get to where we are today. So, in 1970 they came up with RICO "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act" [8]. The concept was supposed to give law enforcement a greater reach for grabbing the tools of the trade. By seizing the assets of the organization itself, the organization would lack the means to continue their criminal activities. Nearly one week later the House and Senate passed the "Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act"[9]. Almost identical to RICO except the wording was aimed specifically toward major drug "king pins. Still, federal, state, and local officials were legally restrained. They had to prove first; that a crime was being committed, and second; how much the criminals profited by it.

 Another problem for law enforcement was their fiscal inability to keep up with the "bad guys" in the kinds of technology and equipment needed to pursue these prosperous criminals. Drug running is big business and "king pins" have the money and the access to the same devices pleaded for by law enforcement budgets. The DEA found themselves being wiretapped and spied on. Drug runners were using inside informants, night vision glasses, scopes, and police monitoring devices to help them stay clear of areas being watched, thereby thwarting every move by law enforcement to capture them in the act. But even after the above mentioned Acts were passed, law enforcement rarely used the new forfeiture laws to their advantage because the statute was badly written and ambiguous. As it was, forfeiture only pertained to the "profits" of the organization or individual. This involved a rather tedious accounting procedure that was deemed "not cost effective" unless the haul was a big one. Law enforcement complained that the criminals had better technology at their disposal than they did so less restrictive laws were needed in order to confiscate and use these devices against the offenders.

 In response to the cries of local law enforcement agencies, new Acts were introduced that would not only expedite the procedures for forfeiture, but broaden the scope of items that could be legally confiscated. As part of the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984" [10], the Attorney General authorized the equitable sharing of forfeited property with cooperating state and local law enforcement agencies. Though a seemingly reasonable expansion to the scope covered under the previous acts, the consequences of this Act, and others that have followed, has put law enforcement agencies in business for themselves, effectively tipping the balance in favor of the governments regulatory interests over the individual's most fundamental constitutional rights.

 How this affects the average citizen.

 In December of last year the ACLU took out a full page ad (see Ref. [1]) in the New York Times to bring attention to the unconstitutionality of the current forfeiture laws. The ad says in part;
"Most victims of forfeiture aren't criminals. Like the 75-year-old grandmother who lost her home because her drug-dealer son once lived there. Or the landscaper whose $9,000 was seized at the airport because "only drug dealers carry that much cash." These people were never arrested or even charged with a crime. And they weren't entitled to a fair hearing, either. It could happen to you." And it's happening every day. All across the country innocent people are being stripped of their belongings because a law enforcement official asserts that the property is guilty of a crime.

 Law enforcement officials have a new motivation for search and seizure-- money. They are no longer motivated by right over wrong or community safety or helping others. The danger now is becoming the next target of law enforcement because of what you own, not what you do. It is this shift in government priority that should be of concern to every citizen. The potential for corruption in this system is profound. It allows any law enforcement officer to decide on the spot whether or not you (or your property) is guilty of a crime and therefore, decide whether or not to relieve you of your property. Since the officer is under no obligation to prove his suspicion in court, or even to get a second opinion, the person is left in a position of trying to prove that they (or their property) did not commit a crime. This is a philosophical logical impossibility since you can not prove a negative. Yet, it is the burden the government imposes on every victim of forfeiture.

 Another twist that compounds the problem is the fact that informants are now allowed to be paid up to 24% of the property forfeited even if they are convicted for participating in the crime (see Ref. [9]). One example is the Avery family of Kentucky [11]. Jon Paul Avery, age 56 and a paraplegic in a wheel chair, owned a 50 acre farm where he lived with his wife, two grown daughters and his three grandchildren. One day his son-in-law and a friend were busted on the property for growing marijuana. Facing long prison sentences they struck a deal with federal and local officials. If they would testify that the owner of the property (Jon Paul) headed an organization of marijuana growers with at least 5 other people under his command, then they would get a reduced sentence. The farm was seized, the family was evicted, and Jon Paul along with both daughters were given prison sentences. Jon Paul received a twenty year sentence.

 The horrible reality in this story is that the ones who were growing and selling the marijuana were given more than $10,000 for their testimony and got off with substantially reduced sentences. Meanwhile, the government moved in and started painting the buildings on the property in order to get them ready for rent. Mrs. Avery was thrown out of her life long residence and is raising her grandchildren in an apartment while her husband and daughters spend the next decade or two in prison. Both Jon Paul and his wife claim they knew nothing about the marijuana. One of the daughters (the one who divorced the informant) stated that the crop was started by her brother who died in a freak accident just three months before the arrests were made. Taking this family's property does not serve the purpose for which forfeiture laws were intended. The only interest being served in this case is the interest of the informants and the interests of the government agencies that now own the 50 acre farm. Putting a paraplegic in prison and evicting his wife and grandchildren doesn't make the community any safer. Taxpayers are now footing the bill for Jon Paul's medical expenses, and the children were not only stripped of their parents and security but they were stripped of their heritage and constitutional rights as well.

 Investigating assets instead of criminal activity: The Donald Scott case.

 Police are spending more of their time researching the value of the property that can be seized from an individual and less time investigating whether or not that individual has actually committed a crime. Consider the case of Donald Scott, a wealthy owner of a 200 acre ranch named Trails End in Malibu. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department failed to find any contraband after they shot him dead in his own home while serving a search warrant. It was later determined that the search warrant was invalid and was obtained after numerous ariel observations and civil trespasses onto the property failed to find any trace of illegal activity. In this case, the Sheriff's department decided they would like to seize this prime real estate and had little concern whether or not they would be putting a major drug dealer out of business (the intention of the forfeiture laws). In meetings that took place just before the raid on Scott's property, officers with several agencies were handed ariel photographs of the property with appraisal values noted on the side along with another piece of paper listing selling prices of other property in the area. One officer was noted as telling another officer that they could seize the property and all assets if they could find 14 marijuana plants.

 In a report issued by Ventura District Attorney Michael D. Bradbury [12] regarding the investigation into Scott's death he states; "The shooting and the events leading up to it have raised a number of issues of concern to this office, other law enforcement agencies, and the public." (p1) This report can be read in its entirety online but I will highlight the issues raised by D.A. Michael Bradbury which pertain directly to the Fourth Amendment and the current forfeiture laws.

Under current California law, property cannot be seized for the cultivation of marijuana. This explains why the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department called in Federal Agencies to assist in the investigation and service of the warrant on Donald Scott. Under Federal law, property can be forfeited for the cultivation of marijuana and the proceeds is then divided up between the agencies involved proportionate to their involvement. Since LASD led the investigation it stood to get the lions share of the property. It's interesting to note here just how many agencies were involved in this warrant. The agencies represented consisted of the LASD, the National Park Service, Drug Enforcement Administration (federal), Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (state), U. S. Forest Service, Los Angeles Police Dept. Canine Unit, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, National Guard, and though not present at the issue of the warrant, the Boarder Patrol conducted investigations on the private property of Donald Scott just days prior to the shooting on behalf of the LASD. This investigation was later deemed by Bradbury's report to have been a violation of Donald Scott's Fourth Amendment rights, and further, found that the Boarder Patrol should not have been involved in the investigation in the first place because their legal authority only extends to cases involving illegal aliens. Another interesting note here is the absence of the Ventura County Sheriff's Office who has jurisdiction over the case because the property is located in Ventura County. Only the road leading into the property is located in Los Angeles County.

 So why did the LASD ask for assistance from all of these agencies except the Ventura County Sheriff's Office? They needed the help of the National Park Service to navigate the area directly surrounding the ranch which boarders federal land. The NPS maintains a list of desirable properties it would like to purchase, and wouldn't you know, the Trails End Ranch is on one of those lists. During Bradbury's investigation he notes that it was mentioned to an officer with the NPS that they (the NPS) might get the land if it was forfeited. No reason was given for inviting federal employees from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory but one can assume that they too were hoping to get a stake in the property. As far as the LASD not informing the Ventura Sheriff's about the situation, it seems that they may have been afraid of losing their claim to a major portion of the bust because of jurisdiction. Bradbury states in his report;
"...it is probable that the Ventura County Sheriff was not called because Los Angeles County did not want to split the forfeiture proceeds-with that agency. The property is worth millions of dollars, which Los Angeles might need to split with the other agencies already involved." (p50)
Another example of department rivalry perhaps? Sharing with federal agencies was necessary but if they had notified Ventura County they would have risked a debate about which department should head the operation and therefore, which department would get the highest cut.

 Michael Bradbury's report makes several other important conclusions regarding the Scott case:

 1. "... if marijuana were found growing, or if narcotics were found in sufficient quantity, it was possible that a very valuable piece of real estate would be forfeited to the government with proceeds from a sale of the property going to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department."(p60)

 If they had found as few as 14 marijuana plants, this man would have lost a 5 million dollar piece of property. A fine of that amount imposed by a judge would clearly be considered "cruel and unusual punishment" and extremely disproportionate to the crime committed.

 2. "It is the District Attorney's opinion that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to seize and forfeit the ranch for the government. Based in part upon the possibility of forfeiture, Spencer obtained a search warrant that was not supported by probable cause. This search warrant became Donald Scott's death warrant."(p61)

Even though the officer in charge didn't stand to gain the property personally, the idea that his department could financially benefit from the seizure was enough motivation for him to lie in order to obtain a search warrant.

 3. "We limit our analysis to the legality of the conduct under existing law and find no legal prohibition to law enforcement investigations with forfeiture of property as a motivating factor." (p34)

 In other words, there is nothing in the law that says law enforcement can't target a person for a criminal investigation based solely on the property they would like to seize. It also means that there is no legal recourse for victims of this type of investigation.

 The Donald Scott case is a perfect example of how law enforcement has changed their agenda. Instead of starting an investigation because there arose a suspicion of criminal activity, the investigation was prompted because of a desire to obtain the property. With that objective in mind, Donald Scott became a target. Had it not been for his assets, it's certain that 14 marijuana plants would not have been serious enough to warrant the type of attention given him by so many government agencies.

 In D. A. Michael Bradbury's report he makes a number of recommendations on how to avoid another Donald Scott incident, one of which states;
"In preparing search warrant affidavits, law enforcement officers must not compromise their objectivity based upon forfeiture concerns. Regardless of whether a given search warrant may result in the forfeiture of valuable property, officers must ensure that there is adequate probable cause." (p62)
This is a good recommendation and should go without saying. However, I find it disturbing that he does not recommend anywhere in his report that officers should restrict their motivation for beginning an investigation to suspicion of criminal activity. By leaving this out, he makes it sound like the possibility of property forfeiture is an acceptable reason to begin an investigation as long as the officer has "adequate probable cause" by the time he asks for a search warrant.

Another disturbing aspect of this case and in many other cases where the police are accused of wrongdoing is the fact that the agency being accused is also the agency designated to look into the wrongdoing. A clear conflict of interest and one that should be addressed. We can not leave it to the police to police themselves. Regarding the Scott case, Bradbury stated;
"The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department allowed Deputy Spencer to participate in the investigation into the circumstances leading to the shooting of Donald Scott. In view of Spencer's activity in procuring the warrant and ultimately shooting Scott, his participation in the ensuing investigation was inappropriate. Officers involved in shooting incidents should not participate in investigations of their own conduct." (p63)
Notice how he limits his words to include only shooting incidents. Imagine, if Donald Scott had not been shot and had been able to file a complaint against the sheriff's department for an illegally obtained warrant, Deputy Spencer's involvement in an after-the-fact investigation would not have been questioned, in fact, it would have been expected. No wonder it is nearly impossible for a citizen to have their complaints taken seriously enough for a district attorney to actually file a criminal charge against a corrupt officer. How can anyone expect a police officer to make an honest attempt to find evidence against himself or his peers regardless of his sworn "objectivity."

Roadside forfeitures in Louisiana.

 Individuals who have been unlucky enough to become a target of forfeiture can not expect any help from the agency that has targeted them. The only recourse is to file a civil action against the offending officers and their departments in the hopes that a truly impartial jury will hear the case. Of course, suits against law enforcement agencies are quite expensive and most often cost more to bring to court than the value of the property seized. It is this very reason why law enforcement regularly targets property with values of less than $10,000. They know that it will cost at least that much to get the property back through civil action.

 An example of this common practice was reported by NBC's news magazine show "Dateline"[13]. They did a story on Louisiana's current abuses of their state forfeiture laws. The story aired first in January of 1997 and was reportedly viewed by more than 12 million people. I saw this story when it first aired and was floored by the blatant thievery being perpetrated on the motorists traveling down Interstate 10 in southwestern Louisiana. The "Dateline" crew equipped their vehicle with hidden cameras and set out on I-10. It wasn't long before they were pulled over for an "illegal lane change" which they did not commit. There were literally hundreds of other people who had been pulled over under the same guise. The officers who stopped the crew asked them how much money they had, just as they did most everyone else they stopped. "Dateline" reporter John Larson spent over a year investigating the story and found that 90 percent of the individuals targeted were minorities with out-of-state plates.

 Another unscrupulous practice by Louisiana is the way they divvy up the booty with 60 percent going to the law enforcement agency that seized the property, 20 percent to the district attorney, and the remaining 20 percent goes to the state judges' "Judicial Expense Fund"-- whatever that is. Just imagine trying to plead your case in front of a judge who just used your money to buy his new leather chair. Conflict of interest? I think so, and so does the ACLU which has been pleading the "conflict of interest" angle ever since Louisiana's forfeiture law was enacted in 1989. As a result of the "Dateline" show some state legislatures have set about trying to reform the statutes in a way that would reduce the chances of police abuses. But an editorial on January 11, 1997, in the Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge) [14] called the recommendations for reform "tame" because "they still allow motorists to be shaken down without evidence of a crime and require citizens to prove they deserve their own property back." In addition, the paper said the system "tempts prosecutors to go easy on real drug lords by making deals to keep seized cars or drug money in exchange for dropping charges and letting the criminal walk." It's obvious that Louisiana's law enforcement cares more about their bank account than they do about their oath to "protect and serve" the community.

 Worse things can happen.

 When tourists disappear the police are forced to start targeting locals and looking for more lucrative forfeitures to finance their "war on drugs." If you think I'm exaggerating about where this policy leads then consider this 1990 bulletin to the country's U.S. Attorneys:

 "Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the Department's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990."[15]

 All of these law enforcement agencies have expected quotas to meet. That's not just incentive, that's pressure. Forfeiture has become so profitable for law enforcement that they are depending on it. So what happens if there's a shortage of "bad guys" to bust in order to replenish the funds? Then they'll settle for the "not so bad guys" or other individuals that might be "bad guys." Bottom line is, we are all potential targets because the term is subjective according to the officer's opinion.

 Why the Department of Justice supports current forfeiture laws.

 According to the DOJ;
"The Asset Forfeiture Program is a nationwide law enforcement program that has become an increasingly important weapon in the fight against crime. The objectives of the program, as set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited Property, July 1990, are: (1) law enforcement: to punish and deter criminal activity; (2) cooperation: to enhance law enforcement cooperation at all levels of government, both domestically and internationally; and (3) revenue: as a by-product of the first two objectives, to produce funds to be reinvested into federal, state, local and international law enforcement." [16]
While the objectives are reasonable, the methods for achieving them are not. As odd as it sounds, the reasons that the DOJ uses to support their position on the current laws, are the very same reasons used against them by supporters of HR 1628. The DOJ insists that;
"Federal civil forfeiture laws contain numerous protections against possible abuse. In civil forfeiture, the property is the "defendant" in the action. The seizure of property is equivalent to the arrest of a person and the forfeiture of property is analogous to the conviction of a person." (see Ref. [16])
It's hard to believe that they see this as a "protection" against possible abuse. People are supposed to feel better about it because it's their property that gets charged with a crime instead of them. Personally, I would feel better if I were charged with the crime so I could, at least, have my day in court. Forfeiture is punishment no matter how they try to disguise it, and punishment without "due process" can only help hide the abuse not protect against it. Other opponents to the Bill being introduced by Illinois Congressman Henry Hyde fear that the imposition of the statute will clog the system and bring back the lengthy red tape once associated with civil forfeiture. The Louisiana Governor is quoted as saying "The proposed forfeiture reform laws will require a judge's authorization before forfeiture can take place. This is a terrible inconvenience to police officers in the field who would then have to explain their reasons to a judge each time they confiscate property."(see Ref. [14] ) And this is unreasonable? Police officers shouldn't mind this minor inconvenience if they have "probable cause" to confiscate property. A judge's endorsement only reinforces their own belief that a crime has occurred and that their action is justified.

 Where we are now and what we can do about it.

 If all of this makes it seem like our Constitution has lost some of its meaning, that's because it has. The Fourth Amendment has been broken down and dissected into so many different interpretations that almost no case falls within it's criteria without being disregarded because of exceptions defined by more recent court precedence. So how do "we the people" get back to a more simplistic interpretation, one which better illustrates the original intent? Once the flood gates have been opened it's extremely difficult to get them closed again. I hate to use cliches, but that one best describes the rate at which these laws have deteriorated our constitutional rights since the 1970's. Simply writing your Senator will not help (unless venting makes you feel better) because law enforcement has a large and far reaching voice which will surely overpower that of any one, or even one hundred, legislators. Forfeiture laws have netted the government over $1.5 billion dollars since 1985 [17] so they're likely to continue to ignore pleas from citizens about little things like civil rights. Exposing the abuse to mass public scrutiny seems to have gotten the attention of Louisiana officials and media attention seems to be the only tool that can stand up against this rampant legal rip-off. If the public cries loud enough we may have a chance at getting HR 1658 through the Senate. Therefore, lessoning the chances of innocent victims loosing it all to the government.

 It will take millions of voices to turn this around and you can bet that law enforcement will be kicking and screaming through the entire process. Law makers work closely with law enforcers and it will take a lot of public manipulation of the political process in order to out-muscle them enough to get some real action - meaning; more laws that reverse the current ones. Politicians respond to their constituents only when the numbers are high and it's voting time. When people start canceling vacations and making plans to drive around a state or county, as happened in Louisiana after the "Dateline" story aired, then the cops run out of people to rob and that is definitely counter productive in the state's eyes. People are on to them and it shows as long as the spotlight keeps shining on them. When it hurts their economy, then they'll listen, and while they're listening we have to demand that our law makers consider the rights of individuals in their policy making process before they give law enforcement a blank check (literally) to use as they see fit. So it's important to keep them listening. Three ways "we the people" can do that is by; 1) getting these stories out to everyone we know; 2) ask for more reporting from the media on the subject; and 3) definitely stay out of Louisiana.

 References:

[1] American Civil Liberty Union Freedom Network. "Imagine that the police had the right to seize your property" (Online) http://www.aclu.org/features/nytimesad121198.html Return
[2] Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, PL 98-473 Sec. 309-310. Although the Fund was initially required to deposit to the Treasury's General Fund all sums in excess of $5 million that remained after authorized payments, this ceiling was abolished by a 1986 amendment. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 524(c)(4), as amended by Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Sec.1152(a)(5), 100 Stat. 3207-12. See also U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy 28 (Sept. 1989) (containing President Bush's endorsement of the policy of using proceeds from forfeiture for law enforcement). Return

[3] HR 1658 makes several important changes to the current laws. One of those calls for the abolishment of "summary forfeiture" (forfeiture without a hearing) and for the court appointment of council in cases where the person can not afford a lawyer. For a complete summary of Current Civil Asset Forfeiture Law; and the Reforms of HR 1658, read the "Legislative Alert" bulletin posted at: http://fear.org/nacdl1658.html

[4] 1984 "Comprehensive Forfeiture Act" part of the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act Of 1984" Pub.L. No. 98-473, Sec. 306(a)(codified as subsection (a)(7) to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881 (authorizing forfeiture of real property used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate a federal drug felony). There is legislative history suggesting seizable property was conceived as property actually used in manufacturing drugs. However courts and prosecutors have interpreted it broadly to include any real property having a connection to a drug offense punishable by a year in prison. Return

[5] 1986 "Anti-drug Abuse Act" added a "substitute assets" law providing that property of an equal value may be forfeited in place of forfeitable assets that are no longer available. Return

[6] The proceedings are instituted against tainted property as a civil in rem proceeding, based on the idea that the property is guilty and not the owner. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1135 (1993); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr-Grant Co. v. U.S., 254 U.S. 505, 511, 41 S. Ct. 189 (1921); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14 (1827) (civil proceeding constitutional because "the offense is attached primarily to the thing"); United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.Va. 1818) No. 15,612). The concept was borrowed from English and biblical law and adapted for use in America during the colonial period. Return

[7] Jefferson, Thomas. "Original Rough Draft of The Declaration of Independence." American Treasures of the Library of Congress. http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trt001.htmlReturn

[8] 1970 "Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act" The Act included a civil forfeiture provision, 21 U.S.C. sec. 881, authorizing the government to seize and forfeit drugs, drug manufacturing and storage equipment, and conveyances used to transport drugs. Return

[9] 1970 "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act", 18 U.S.C. Sec.1961-68 (enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970), and in the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, now codified at 3q U.S.C. Sec. 5317(c). Return

[10] Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(e)(2)(B), whenever money is seized by a purely federal agency other than the postal service, the agency may keep the expenses related to the seizure, and must transfer the rest to the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund. This Fund is earmarked for law enforcement. It may not be used to pay the salaries of United States employees, but may be used to pay informants for information, or to pay salaries of local police or other non-federal employees. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 524; Directive 90-5, "The Attorney-General's Guidelines on Seized and Forfeited Property" (July 31, 1990), at VII(D). Return

[11] Bergman, Kathy. "When Punishment Is So Harsh That Forfeiture Seems Incidental." Forfeiture Endangers American Rights. (Online). 30 December 1995. http://fear.org/avery.html Return

[12] Office of the District Attorney County of Ventura State of California. Report On The Death Of Donald Scott, by Ventura County (CA) District Attorney Michael D. Bradbury. 30 March 1993 (64 pp.) The full report is posted at: http://fear.org/chron/scott.txt Return

[13] "Federal Seizure of Illegal Assets Nets Government $1.5 Billion Since 1985", U.S.Law Week (Daily Edition), Feb. 4, 1991. Return

[14] Dateline, NBC News, August 22, 1997. Transcripts of the Dateline series can be obtained by sending $7.00 to Burrelle's Transcripts, Box 7, Livingston, NJ 07039. They also have some video copies of some programs. Return

[15] "OUR VIEWS: La. deserves this black eye," Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), January 11, 1997, p. 6B. The Baton Rouge Advocate published a series of essays on the "Dateline" story and subsequent maneuverings of the Louisiana politicians. Contact them for copies (there is a small cost). Return

[16] National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) (Online) "Civil" Forfeiture: Legislative Reform Urgently Needed" 7 August 1999. http://www.criminaljustice.org/legis/leg01.htm Return

[17] THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. "The Attorney General's Guidelines for Seized and Forfeited Property, July 1990" Appendix 1. (Online) 27 Oct. 1998. http://www.usdoj.gov/